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1 
 
THE MULTIPLE TEMPORALITIES OF SECURITY: LONG-TERM 
SUSTAINABILITY, THE EVERYDAY, AND THE EMERGENT IN THE 
ANTHROPOCENE 
 
$GDP&UDZIRUG 
 
 
$EVWUDFW 
 
7KH$QWKURSRFHQHGHPDQGVDUH-HYDOXDWLRQRIKRZZHWKLQNDERXWKLVWRULFDOWLPHDFURVV
YDULRXVGLVFLSOLQHVDQGILHOGVRIDQDO\VLV,WFKDOOHQJHVVFKRODUVWRFRQQHFWXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRI
WKHSDVWZLWKWKRVHRIWKHHPHUJLQJSUHVHQWDQGORQJ-WHUPIXWXUH5HFRJQLVLQJWKDWPDQ\RI
WKHIXWXUHJOREDOFKDOOHQJHVRILQVHFXULW\DQGFRQIOLFWZLOOEHSURGXFWVRIFOLPDWHFKDQJH±
SURPSWHGE\GURXJKWGHVHUWLILFDWLRQDQGPLJUDWLRQ-WKLVFKDSWHUVHHNVWRUHIOHFWXSRQDQG
H[SORUHWKHFRQFHSWXDOLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUKLVWRULFDOWLPHDQGWHPSRUDOLVDWLRQVSURPSWHGE\WKH
$QWKURSRFHQH,WLVVXJJHVWHGWKDWVRFLDOVFLHQWLVWVQHHGWRUHFRQVLGHUUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQ
GLIIHUHQWWHPSRUDOLWLHVLQWKHSURGXFWLRQRIDQGUHVSRQVHVWRFRQWHPSRUDU\LQVHFXULWLHV,QVR
GRLQJWKHFKDSWHUH[SORUHVWKHPHDQLQJVRIDQGLQWHUFRQQHFWLRQVEHWZHHQµVHFXULW\¶DQG
FRQFHSWVRIµVXVWDLQDELOLW\¶WKHµHYHU\GD\¶DQGWKHµHPHUJHQW¶LQWKHVWXG\RIFULPHULVNV
DQGKDUPV(DFKLVLQIRUPHGE\GLIIHUHQWWHPSRUDOUHJLVWHUV that imply differing ethical 
considerations. Exploring their intersectionality, sites of contestation and their interwoven 
assemblage raise salient issues for critical security studies in an anthropogenic age. The 
challenge is to shape new normative understandings of security, ethics and 
social/environmental justice to inform practices in ways that give due consideration to these 
different temporalities and their implications. 
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,QWURGXFWLRQ 
Recent years have witnessed extensive debates about the environmental risks of global 
warming and human-induced climate change prompted by excessive accumulation in the 
atmosphere of greenhouse gases mainly as a result of the burning of fossil fuel and the 
industrialised practices of animal farming. 7KH$QWKURSRFHQH²LGHQWLILHGE\&UXW]HQDQG
6WRHUPHUDVµWKHUHFHQWDJHRIPDQ¶²UHSUHVHQWVDQHZDQGGLVWLQFWHSRFK
FKDUDFWHULVHGE\WKHIDFWWKDWµWKHKXPDQLPSULQWRQWKHJOREDOHQYLURQPHQWKDVQRZEHFRPH
VRODUJHDQGDFWLYHWKDWLWULYDOVVRPHRIWKHJUHDWIRUFHVRIQDWXUHLQLWVLPSDFWRQWKH
IXQFWLRQLQJRIWKH(DUWKV\VWHP¶6WHIIHQHWDO,WVGHILQLQJIHDWXUHVare both the 
trend towards global warming and the radical instability expected of future environments. ,W
UHSUHVHQWVDQHZJHRORJLFDOHSRFKLQZKLFKKXPDQH[LVWHQFHKDVEHFRPHDJHRORJLFDOIRUFH
VLJQDOOLQJDIXQGDPHQWDOVKLIWLQWKHFDSDFLW\RIKXPDQVWRH[HUWLQIOXHQFHRYHUDQGUH-VKDSH
WKH(DUWK¶VDWPRVSKHULFSDWWHUQVDQGKHQFHGHWHUPLQHWKHGLUHFWLRQRIWKHFOLPDWHIRU
PLOOHQQLDWRFRPH,QWKHSURFHVVKXPDQEHLQJVKDYHEHFRPHDJHRORJLFDODJHQWGLVWXUELQJ
WKHSDUDPHWLFLHERXQGDU\FRQGLWLRQVQHHGHGIRURXURZQH[LVWHQFH 
There remain ongoing debates about the term Anthropocene, its chronology and usefulness
%RQQHXLODQG)UHVVR]+DPLOWRQHWDO. On the basis of analyses of air trapped 
in polar ice, Crutzen (2002: 23) traces the beginning of growing global concentrations of 
carbon dioxide and methane to the later part of the eighteenth century and names a specific 
date,  1784, which portentously coincides with -DPHV:DWW¶VGHVLJQRIWKHVWHDPHQJLQH. 
More broadly, the Anthropocene is associated with capitalist industrialisation, whilst others 
suggest that it dates back to the origins of farming thousands of years earlier (Ruddiman, 
2005). The complexities of historical periodisation have led some, rather dismissively, to 
FRQFOXGHµSuch haziness suggests that the term, which smacks of species vanity, is 
VRPHZKDWRYHUZURXJKW¶Corfield, 2011: 7). Nonetheless, tKHLGHQWLILFDWLRQDQG
FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIWKH$QWKURSRFHQHXQGRXEWHGO\KDVFKDOOHQJHGPDQ\FRQYHQWLRQDO
DVVXPSWLRQVDQGDFDGHPLFGLVFLSOLQHVLQDYDULHW\RISURIRXQGZD\VQRWDEO\KLVWRU\DQGRXU
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWLPH TKHGHVLJQDWLRQRIWKH$QWKURSRFHQHKDVFDXVHGVFKRODUVWRWKLQN
GLIIHUHQWO\DERXWERWKWKHLPSDFWRIKXPDQDFWLRQVRQWKHHFRV\VWHPDQGWKHVXVWDLQDELOLW\RI
RIWHQWDNHQIRUJUDQWHGFRQWHPSRUDU\VRFLDOSUDFWLFHVKXPDQDFWLYLWLHVSDWWHUQVDQGZD\VRI
ZRUNLQJJLYHQWKHLUORQJ-WHUPVRFLDODQGHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSOLFDWLRQVDQGFRQVHTXHQFHV 
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:KLOHWKHSRWHQWLDOIRUGHVWUXFWLRQRIWKHJOREDOHFRV\VWHPDQGKXPDQLW\KDVEHHQZLWKXV
VLQFHWKHILUVWDWRPLFERPEZDVH[SORGHGLQWKHLPSDFWRQFOLPDWHFKDQJHKDVQHLWKHU
EHHQDFRQVFLRXVQRUGHOLEHUDWHO\PDOLJQRQHµOn the contrary¶/HYHQHQRWHV, µone might 
argue that it is simply an indirect consequence of essentially constructive efforts at self-
EHWWHUPHQW¶7KH$QWKURSRFHQHFKDOOHQJHVQRWRQO\RXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIKXPDQ
DQGHQYLURQPHQWDOIXWXUHVEXWDOVRRXULQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIWKHSDVWUHJDUGLQJKRZZHJRWWR
WKLVHQG-SRLQWLQKLVWRU\%RQQHXLODQG)UHVVR]DVZHOODVWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ
WKHSDVWSUHVHQWDQGIXWXUH$nthropogenic explanations of climate change erode 
conventional humanist distinctions between natural history and human history. Chakrabarty 
notes 
The discipline of history exists on the assumption that our past, present, and future are 
connected by a certain continuity of human experience. We normally envisage the 
future with the help of the same faculty that allows us to picture the past. (2009: 197) 
 
$FFRUGLQJWR&KDNUDEDUW\PRGHUQLW\¶VFORVHFRQQHFWLRQZLWKWKHFRQFHSWRIµIUHHGRP¶LQ
terms of human agency and sovereignty, was not accompanied by any discussion or 
DZDUHQHVVRIµWKHJHRORJLFDODJHQF\WKDWKXPDQEHLQJVZHUHDFTXLULQJDWWKHVDPHWLPHDV
and through processes clRVHO\OLQNHGWRWKHLUDFTXLVLWLRQRIIUHHGRP¶ 
Enlightenment philosophers of freedom, he argues, were primarily concerned with how 
humans would escape injustice, oppression and inequality imposed upon them by other 
humans. As a result, µ[t]he mansion of modern freedoms stands on an ever-expanding base of 
fossil-IXHOXVH¶Consequently, the Anthropocene challenges the ways in which 
we have thought about both time and ourselves as social and geological agents since the 
Enlightenment. It GHPDQGVDUH-HYDOXDWLRQRIKRZZHWKLQNDERXWKLVWRULFDOWLPHDFURVV
YDULRXVGLVFLSOLQHVDQGILHOGVRIDQDO\VLVE\FKDOOHQJLQJVFKRODUVWRFRQQHFWXQGHUVWDQGLQJV
RIWKHSDVWZLWKWKRVHRIWKHHPHUJLQJSUHVHQWDQGORQJ-WHUPIXWXUH$V,ZLOODUJXHLWDOVR
UDLVHVLPSRUWDQWTXHVWLRQVDERXWDJHQF\DQGPRUDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\,WSODFHVTXHVWLRQVDERXW
WKHPRUDODQGSROLWLFDOFKDOOHQJHRIFOLPDWHFKDQJHFHQWUHVWDJHQRWVLPSO\IRUFOLPDWHDQG
HQYLURQPHQWDOVFLHQFHVEXWDOVRDQGDVSURIRXQGO\IRUWKHVRFLDOVFLHQFHV,QPDQ\VHQVHV
WKHVRFLDOVFLHQFHVKDYHODJJHGEHKLQGLQWKHLUHQJDJHPHQWZLWKWKH$QWKURSRFHQHDQGLWV
SURIRXQGUDPLILFDWLRQVIRUWKHRULVLQJGLYHUVHDVSHFWVRIVRFLDOUHODWLRQVDQGJOREDOVRFLHWDO
FKDOOHQJHVRIWKHIXWXUH3DOVVRQHWDOLQFOXGLQJFULPHVHFXULW\DQGRUGHU 
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0\SXUSRVHLVQRWWRWUDFHWKHYDULRXVVHFXULW\DQGFULPHFRQWUROLPSOLFDWLRQVRIJOREDO
FOLPDWHFKDQJH-ZKLFKDUHH[WHQVLYHLQWKHPVHOYHVEXWFRYHUHGEHWWHUE\RWKHUVVHHWKLV
YROXPH-EXWWRUHIOHFWXSRQDQGH[SORUHWKHFRQFHSWXDOLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUKLVWRULFDOWLPHDQG
WHPSRUDOLVDWLRQVSURPSWHGE\WKH$QWKURSRFHQH,EHJLQE\KLJKOLJKWLQJVRPHRIWKHNH\
TXHVWLRQVDERXWKLVWRULFDOWLPHWHPSRUDOLW\DQGRXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRILQWHUFRQQHFWLRQV
EHWZHHQWKHSDVWSUHVHQWDQGIXWXUHDQGDSSO\WKHVHWRWKHVWXG\RIVHFXULW\,Q
DFNQRZOHGJLQJWKH$QWKURSRFHQH,VXJJHVWWKDWVRFLDOVFLHQWLVWVQHHGWRUHFRQVLGHU
UHODWLRQVEHWZHHQGLIIHUHQWWHPSRUDOLWLHVLQWKHSURGXFWLRQRIDQGUHVSRQVHVWRFRQWHPSRUDU\
LQVHFXULWLHV,QVRGRLQJWKLVFKDSWHUZLOOVHHNWRH[SORUHWKHPHDQLQJVHWKLFVDQG
LQWHUFRQQHFWLRQVZLWKLQDQGEHWZHHQµVHFXULW\¶DQGWKUHHNH\WHPSRUDOFRQFHSWVEHLQJ
µVXVWDLQDELOLW\¶WKHµHYHU\GD\¶DQGWKHµHPHUJHQW¶LQWKHVWXG\RIFULPHULVNVDQGKDUPV
7KXVWKHDLPLVWRFRQWULEXWHWRUHQHZHGWKLQNLQJDERXWWKHIXWXUHVRIVHFXULW\VWXGLHVDQG
FULPLQRORJ\¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWKHUHLQ6KHDULQJ&UDZIRUGDQG+XWFKLQVRQD
'UDZLQJRQLQVLJKWVIURP&RUILHOG,DUJXHWKDWHDFKRIWKHVHWKUHHFRQFHSWVLV
LQIRUPHGE\DYHU\GLIIHUHQWWHPSRUDOUHJLVWHUZKLFK, in turn, implies differing ethical 
considerations with regard to security. Exploring their intersectionality, sites of contestation 
and their interwoven assemblage raise salient issues for critical security studies in an 
anthropogenic age. The challenge, I infer, is to shape new normative understandings of 
security, ethics and social/environmental justice to inform practices in ways that give due 
consideration to these different temporalities and their implications. 
 
Historical time in the plural 
German historian Reinhardt Koselleck (2002; 2004) helpfully introduced the notion of 
µWHPSRUDOOD\HUV¶VXJJHVWLQJWKDWKLVWRULFDOFKDQJHLVQRWDVLQJXODURUXQLYHUVDO
phenomenon, but is instead distributed across various temporal strata. He SURSRVHGWKHLGHD
WKDWKLVWRU\FRQWDLQVWKUHHOD\HUVRIWHPSRUDOVWUXFWXUHV7KHILUVWOD\HULVWKDWRIHYHQWV
ZKLFKKXPDQEHLQJVKDELWXDOO\H[SHULHQFHDVVLQJXODU7KHVHFRQGFRQVLVWVRIYDULRXVOD\HUV
RIUHFXUVLYHVWUXFWXUHVLQZKLFKVLQJXODUHYHQWVDUHHPEHGGHG17KHWKLUGOD\HUFRQFHUQVD
W\SHRIUHSHWLWLRQWKDWLVELRORJLFDODQGDQWKURSRORJLFDOLQQDWXUHDQGWKXVWUDQVFHQGVKLVWRU\
&RQVHTXHQWO\.RVHOOHFN highlighted the possibility that human history is fundamentally 
plural (Olsen, 2012). At some levels, historical change manifests as a radical, geological 
                                                             
1
 The singular is conditioned by recursive structures ± µFHUWDLQrecursive patterns provide events with common 
features, and at the same time the events are always characterized by a singular GLPHQVLRQ¶)RU
instance, receiving a letter is of singular importance for the receiver ± but the letter can only be received because 
of the established structure of the mail service. 
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rupture; at others, it appears almost glacial in terms of the slow pace of movement and 
change. The Anthropocene as a new epoch in the history of the Earth compellingly links a 
long-term historical analysis - undertaken by climatologists - into a predictive future. In so 
doing, it questions the idea of history as a singular, universal, progressive process. Whilst 
anthropogenic climate change is intimately connected with the history of industrialisation and 
capitalist accumulation, it also causes us to think DERXWµGHHSKLVWRU\¶, which extends far 
beyond the recorded history of humans. More fundamentally, ZHQHHGWRFRQQHFWKLVWRU\¶V
different temporal registers; the long-term with the more immediate, short-term and the 
emergent. In this vein, Chakrabarty concludes:  
The task of placing, historically, the crisis of climate change thus requires us to bring 
together intellectual formations that are somewhat in tension with each other: the 
planetary and the global; deep and recorded histories; species thinking and critiques of 
capital. (2009: 213)  
This requires a nuanced understanding of the interwoven inter-connections and 
interdependencies between differing temporalities. 
The crisis of climate change calls for thinking simultaneously on both registers, to mix 
together the immiscible chronologies of capital and species history. This combination, 
however, stretches, in quite fundamental ways, the very idea of historical 
understanding. (Chakrabarty, 2009: 220) 
 
Furthermore, in thinking forward through the past, the Anthropocene serves as a graphic 
illustration of the plural nature of historical time, as global warming is simultaneously a 
glacial, incremental and unintended process and one with turbulent and seismic geological 
and human implications.  
 
,QZKDWIROORZV,ZDQWWRSLFNXSRQWKLVSURPSWLQJE\&KDNUDEDUW\WREHJLQWRWKLQN
GLIIHUHQWO\DERXWWKHWHPSRUDOUHJLVWHUVWKDWDSSO\WRFRQFHSWVDQGSUDFWLFHVRIVHFXULW\DQG
WKHLULPSOLFDWLRQVLQDQDQWKURSRJHQLFDJH ,QKHUPDMHVWLF7LPHDQGWKH6KDSHRI+LVWRU\
3HQHORSH&RUILHOGGHPRQVWUDWHVKRZWKHKLVWRU\RIKXPDQH[LVWHQFHLVDEUDLGHG
DVVHPEODJHZLWKLQWLPHDQGVSDFHRIWKUHHLQWHUZRYHQGLPHQVLRQV7KHILUVWLVSHUVLVWHQFH
ZLWKLWVDWWULEXWHVRIFRQWLQXLW\DQGVWDELOLW\7KHVHFRQGGLPHQVLRQLVPLFUR-FKDQJHZLWKLWV
FKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIDGDSWDWLRQDFFXPXODWLRQDQGPRPHQWXP7KLUGLVUDGLFDOGLVFRQWLQXLW\
ZLWKLWVWUDLWVRIWXUEXOHQFHWUDQVIRUPDWLRQDQGPDFUR-FKDQJH6KHQRWHV 
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7KHSDVWDVLWPHUJHVZLWKWKHSUHVHQWSURYLGHVDPSOHHYLGHQFHRIKXPDQ
H[SHULHQFHVRIWKHIDPLOLDUPL[WXUHRIWKHSHUVLVWHQFHZLWKLWVFRPSRQHQWVRI
VWDELOLW\-ORFDWLRQ-DGGLWLRQPLFUR-FKDQJHZLWKLWVHOHPHQWVRIDGDSWDWLRQ-
DFFXPXODWLRQ-WUHQGDQGUDGLFDOGLVFRQWLQXLW\ZLWKLWVFRQWULEXWLRQRIWXUEXOHQFH-
IULFWLRQ-DQGPDFUR-WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ&RUILHOG 
)URPWKLVSHUVSHFWLYHµWKHORQJWHUPLVDOZD\VGHWHFWDEOHLQWKHLPPHGLDWHPRPHQWMXVWDV
WKHV\QFKURQLFPRPHQWLVDOZD\VPHVKHGLQWRDGLDFKURQLFIUDPH¶&RUILHOG7KH
HVVHQWLDOSRLQWKRZHYHULVQRWWRORVHVLJKWRIDOOWKUHHGLPHQVLRQVQRUWKHLU
LQWHUFRQQHFWHGQHVV7KHFKDOOHQJHVKHDUJXHVLVµWRILQGPXOWLGLPHQVLRQDOZD\VRI
LQWHUSUHWLQJWKHFRPELQDWLRQRISHUVLVWHQFHDFFXPXODWLRQDQGWUDQVIRUPDWLRQWKDWEHWZHHQ
WKHPVKDSHWKHSDVWDQGSUHVHQWDQGSURVSHFWLYHO\WKHIXWXUHWRR¶&RUILHOG 
 
&RUILHOG¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHVKDSHRIKLVWRU\PHVKHVZHOOZLWKUHFHQWWKLQNLQJZLWKLQ
social ecology on the patterns of interactions across multiple small-scale pressures and strains 
that connect together and magnify to produce larger catastrophic crises. These have the 
capacity to spread across the boundaries of different domains, networks and systems, shifting 
from micro-changes to major disasters and conflicts, with profound implications for how we 
conceive of contemporary insecurities, risk and harms of various kinds. Homer-Dixon and 
FROOHDJXHVRXWOLQHDFRQFHSWXDOIUDPHZRUNRIµV\QFKURQRXVIDLOXUH¶LQWKHFDXVDO
architecture of global crises that reveals deep causes, intermediate processes and ultimate 
outcomes of the pattern of multiple, simultaneous and interacting stresses within and between 
social-ecological systems. They probe some of the multi-dimensional ways in which differing 
temporal layers ± LQHVVHQFH&RUILHOG¶VWULSW\FKRISHUVLVWHQFHDFFXPXODWLRQDQG
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ-interact. For Homer-Dixon et al., the scale of human economic activity in 
UHODWLRQWRWKH(DUWK¶VQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHVDQGWKHLPSDFWRIKXPDQ-induced change on the 
natural environment (as evidenced by the Anthropocene), combined with greater human 
connectivity ± in teUPVRIQHWZRUNV¶GHQVLW\FDSDFLW\DQGVSHHG± and increased cultural 
homogeneity are all trends that contribute (separately and collectively) to conditions 
IDYRXULQJWKHOLNHOLKRRGRILQFUHDVHGµV\QFKURQRXVIDLOXUH¶LQWKHIXWXUH7KHVHUHFHQW
tendencies JHQHUDWHVWUHVVHVDQGµrisks of large and abrupt systemic disruption and by helping 
VXFKGLVUXSWLRQVSURSDJDWHIDUWKHUDQGIDVWHUWKURXJKJOREDOQHWZRUNV¶+RPHU-Dixon, 2015: 
3). Nonetheless, they also engender societal benefits in terms of enhancing capacities for 
repair and resilience, stimulating innovation and adaptation.  
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Homer-Dixon et al. JRRQWRLGHQWLI\WKUHHDUFKHW\SDOSURFHVVHVRIµV\QFKURQRXV
IDLOXUH¶)LUVWWKHlong fuse big bang arises from the slow accumulation of stresses, which can 
FDXVHµDVXGGHQQRQOLQHDULW\¶LQZKLFKWKHUDWHRIFKDQJHµVKLIWVDEUXSWO\IURPVORZWRIDVW¶
Second, the simultaneous stresses DUFKHW\SHLOOXVWUDWHVKRZµPXOWLSOHVWUHVVHVRSHUDWLQJ
simultaneously can combine in their total impacWRIWHQV\QHUJLVWLFDOO\¶7KLUGWKHramifying 
cascade KLJKOLJKWVKRZGLVUXSWLRQVRUVKRFNVDULVLQJIURPµVXGGHQQRQOLQHDULWLHVFDQ
SURSDJDWHUDSLGO\¶DFURVVWLJKWO\FRXSOHGVRFLDODQGHFRORJLFDOQHWZRUNV,PSRUWDQWO\HDFK
pattern highlights and is attentive to the causal links between stresses that can occur along a 
range of temporal stages in the life-course of stresses and their impacts. The authors seek to 
illustrate each archetype and their causal, temporal and spatial structures with reference to 
empirical examples from the financial-energy and food-energy crises of 2008. They explicitly 
differentiate between two temporal stages: first, slow processes mainly functioning within 
single systems; and secondly, fast processes operating across multiple systems. In so doing, 
WKH\GUDZDWWHQWLRQWRµHPHUJHQWSDWWHUQV¶QRQ-linear reciprocal relations and feedback loops, 
all of which have significant implications for thinking about the multiple temporalities of 
security. Finally, for our purposes, they also alOXGHWRWKHµGHHSHWKLFDO¶, as well as practical 
inferences of such insights (Homer-Dixon et al., 2015: 1). 
 
Developing upon these important conceptual probings, the crux of my argument is first, that 
security itself is a temporal concept ± it engenders a certain temporality. Secondly, in an 
anthropogenic age, we can explore and analyse security and the challenges that it presents in 
relation to three key concepts, each of which evokes a different temporal register. In essence, 
WKH\DUHµWHPSRUDOWHUPV¶(DFKFRUUHVSRQGVEURDGO\WRRQHRI&RUILHOG¶VWULSOHW)LUVW
sustainability calls to mind the long-term of persistence and continuity; it speaks to 
generations to come. The µHYHU\GD\¶ suggests micro-change, accumulation and momentum; it 
conveys repetition, not simply referring to the singular, exceptional or unique but also to that 
ZKLFKRFFXUVµGD\DIWHUGD\¶7KHµHPHUJHQW¶ speaks to a much more imminent and short-
term time frame ± the constantly emerging present ± which, when conjoined with the concept 
of security, evokes radical discontinuity with its traits of turbulence, transformation and 
macro-FKDQJHLWLQGXFHVVSHHGXUJHQF\HPHUJHQF\DQGDµQRZQHVV¶7KHVHLQWXUQ
HQFRXUDJHXVWRWKLQNGLIIHUHQWO\DERXWWKHHWKLFVRIVHFXULW\PRUDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\DQGMXVWLFH 
Together, they reveal the complex interplay between differing temporalities and the need to 
understand their intersections and interconnections, as well as points of congruence and 
dissonance. 
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&OLPDWHFKDQJHXUEDQJURZWKDQGWKHSURPLVFXLW\RIVHFXULW\ 
,QZKDWIROORZV,ZLVKWRDUJXHWKDWHQJDJLQJZLWKWKH$QWKURSRFHQHKDVZLGH-UDQJLQJ
LPSOLFDWLRQVIRURXUFRQFHSWLRQVDQGDQDO\VHVRIVHFXULW\7KLVLVHYLGHQWILUVWDQGPRVW
REYLRXVO\LQWKHYHU\GLUHFWVHQVHWKDWPDQ\RIWKHIXWXUHJOREDOFKDOOHQJHVRILQVHFXULW\DQG
FRQIOLFWZLOOWKHPVHOYHVEHSURGXFWVRIJOREDOZDUPLQJDVODUJHVZDWKHVRISHRSOHVEHFRPH
refugees from predicted epicenters of drought and desertification or from the flooding of 
densely-settled, mega-delta regions. Environmental change has already become a major force 
propelling migration and displacement across the world, SURPSWLQJµFOLPDWHUHIXJHHV¶
(Gemenne, 2015). As such, global warming is likely to exacerbate the existing and growing 
geography of inequality and the uneven distribution of lived insecurity. Allied to this, at some 
SRLQWLQµhomo sapiens¶EHFDPHµhomo urbanus¶LQWKDWWKHSURSRUWLRQRIWKHZRUOG¶V
population living in cities now exceeds 50 per cent - as contrasted with only three per cent in 
1800 when the Anthropocene began (The Economist, 2007). Contemporary urbanisation, 
however, is largely a phenomenon of poor and middle-income countries. By and large, the 
rich world has put most of its urbanisation behind it. In poor countries, though, the trend is set 
to continue. The bulk of urban growth is being absorbed in the worlG¶VSUHFDULRXVVOXPV
(Davis, 2006). The United Nations forecasts that the current population of approximately 7.5 
billion will rise to over 9 billion by 2050, when two-thirds of people will live in cities (United 
Nations, 2014: 1). The increase will be most dramatically felt in the poorest and least-
urbanised continents of Asia and Africa. Yet, these are the countries least able to cope with 
the confluence of mass urbanisation and climate change. Additionally, cities are responsible 
for more than 70 per cent of global carbon dioxide emissions (UN-Habitat, 2016: 1). 7RGD\¶V
large cities and fastest growing urban agglomerations are concentrated in the global South; by 
2030, some 13 new mega-cities (of over 10 million population) are expected to emerge in less 
developed countries  (United Nations, 2014: 80). The scale and pace of this growth is 
creating unprecedented social, political, cultural and environmental challenges. For many, 
these urban agglomerations are not the rich, vibrant cultural centres associated by many 
contemporary western urbanists within the modern cities. Rather, in many developing 
countries, urban expansion has been characterised by informality, illegality and unplanned 
settlements; such that above all else, urban growth has been intensely associated with poverty 
and slum growth. The growing urban divide between the affluent and the poor provides 
particularly fertile ground for social conflict and instability. Where once living together 
assisted collective security, increasingly in the future, as these trends intensify, living 
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together in human settlements will engender insecurities of various kinds both in the 
immediate and in the longer-term.  
 
Belatedly, criminology has begun to pay greater heed to the variety of crimes, harms and 
risks associated with global climate change and how these impinge on humans and non-
human species (Lynch and Stretesky, 2010; Agnew, 2011; this volume). Security scholars, 
likewise, have increasingly come to consider both the broad theoretical challenges presented 
by the Anthropocene, as well as the practical future security implications for the globe 
(Dalby, 2007; 2014). For &KDQGOHUWKH$QWKURSRFHQHSUHVHQWV µDIXQGDPHQWDOFKDOOHQJHWR
previous epistemological and ontological assumptions about how we know and how we 
govern/secure in a world that is no longer perceived as open to linear temporalities of cause-
and-HIIHFW¶$GGLWLRQDOO\Fagan has argued that the Anthropocene puts into 
question one of the key organising logics upon which much security discourse is built: the 
separation between human and nature and the distinction between referent objects. 
3URYRFDWLYHO\VKHVXJJHVWVWKDWWKH$QWKURSRFHQHµSXWVLQWRTXHVWLRQWKHSRVVLELOLW\DQG
GHVLUDELOLW\RIVHFXULW\¶)DJDQ, 2016: 18) and she goes on WRDVNµZKDWZRXOGDVHFXULW\
ORRNOLNHZKRVHVXEMHFWZDVQRWPRGHUQPDQ"¶ 
 
More generally, social theorists have identified the manner in which the Anthropocene 
LPSOLHVWKDWZHDUHOLYLQJLQDQDJHRIµPDQXIDFWXUHGXQFHUWDLQW\¶%HFN, 2009), whereby 
security threats (notably those prompted by climate change) can no longer be seen as external 
but rather arise out of and through societal processes.2 Following Chakrabarty (2009), these 
VHFXULW\WKUHDWVDUHLQWULQVLFWRWKHPRGHUQµDFTXLVLWLRQRIIUHHGRP¶DQGLQGXVWULDOSURVSHULW\
As contemporary threats and challenges to social order have become more complex, 
interdependent and interconnected, so too the concept of security is no longer static but fluid; 
influenced by the interplay between a range of factors, fields and forces. In various ways, 
security is on the move. So too, in its movement the concept of security also enlarges and 
invades new domains. For example, the response of many nation states to amplified 
insecurity, threats and the fear of conflict, violence and crime has been increased resort to 
processes of securitisation, criminalisation and militarisation. As a result, security has 
become an increasingly important strategic lens through which diverse areas of economic, 
                                                             
2
 $FFRUGLQJWR%HFNµPDQXIDFWXUHGXQFHUWDLQWLHV¶are µdependent on human decisions, created by society itself, 
immanent to society and thus non-externalizable, collectively imposed and thus individually unavoidable; their 
perceptions break with the past, break with experienced risks and institutionalized routines; they are 
incalculable, uncontrollable and in the final analysis no longer (privately) insurable¶ 
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environmental and social life are thought about and governed. It has become an organising 
concept central to the exercise of authority across numerous domains; such that µJRYHUQing 
WKURXJKFULPH¶6LPRQ, 2007) - and (in)security - have become prominent political responses. 
In the face of growing climate migration and conflict-related people-movement, this has been 
particularly notable with regard to the fortification of border security networks and the 
intertwinement of immigration control and crime control. The process referred to as 
µFULPPLJUDWLRQ¶6WXPSI, 2006) has seen distinctions between migration administration and 
FULPLQDOMXVWLFHVXSHUVHGHGE\µQRYHODVVHPEODJHV¶RIODZand order and border control (Aas, 
2011; Aas and Bosworth, 2013). This has resulted in the institutionalised use of crime control 
techniques, governmental practices and technologies within the regulatory system of 
population management.  
 
Alongside the securitisation of urban life through heightened surveillance and embedded 
crime control, recent years have witnessed an evolving promiscuity of security as a governing 
frame of reference (Crawford, 2014a). The concept of security has not only colonised 
immigration and social policies ± such as housing, health, education and employment and 
workfare ± but its promiscuity has extended farther afield. From energy, food, water and 
human well-being, to global conflict, environmental survival and natural resources, the 
technologies, discourses and metaphors associated with security have become increasingly 
eminent features of contemporary institutions and governing bodies. A pervasive ramification 
RIWKH$QWKURSRFHQHLVWKDWZHQRZWDONIRUH[DPSOHDERXWµIRRGVHFXULW\¶DVDZD\RI
framing - and, to a degree, in place of - issues of food scarcity and shortage, as well as 
LQHTXDOLWLHVRIIRRGSURGXFWLRQVXSSO\DQGGLVWULEXWLRQ+HQFHVHFXULW\µWDON¶KDVEHFRPH
simultaneously more significant, increasingly consequential and more unrestrained.  
 
The temporality of security 
Valverde (2014) has compellingly argued that temporality is central to all security projects. 
Security is concerned not simply with managing present threats and risks but also with 
governing as yet unknown futures. Feeling secure demands not only the absence of direct 
harms in the moment but also assurances that the conditions underpinning our security will 
persist into the future. Moreover, security practices and technologies have both short-term 
implications and longer-term consequences ± they exert an evident temporality. The evolving 
and interdependent nature of security problems means that nothing done to solve one security 
hazard is not without impacts. There is a degree of recursiveness in the ways in which 
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intentional security measures feedback onto and effect subsequent security - both at the level 
RIVXEMHFWLYHSHUFHSWLRQVDQGREMHFWLYHUHDOLW\7RGD\¶VTXHVWVIRUVHFXULW\LQWKHLUDWWHPSWVWR
control present risks and assuage extant fears, frequently scatter the future with sources of 
insecurity. (YRNLQJµVHFXULW\¶DV+X\VPDQVKDVQRWHGPD\EULQJDERXWSUHFLVHO\WKDW
which one is trying to avoid. Security programmes ± QRWDEO\µHPHUJHQF\PHDVXUHV¶± may 
provide temporary relief, but will often have ramifications that reverberate into the future. 
They can exhibit patterns of causation and outcomes that approximate to Homer-Dixon and 
FROOHDJXH¶VDUFKHW\SHVRIWKHµORQJIXVHELJEDQJ¶µVLPXOWDQHRXVVWUHVVHV¶DQG
µUDPLI\LQJFDVFDGH¶ZKHUHE\LQGHSHQGHQWDQGLQWHUGHSHQGHQWIDFWRUVFDQLQWHUDFWLQZD\V
that combine in their effects within and across networks with cumulative or additional 
consequences, subsequently shifting between temporal registers from continuity, through 
momentum to turbulence.  
 
,WLVSUHFLVHO\WKLVTXDOLW\RIXQLQWHQGHGFRQVHTXHQFHVRIµVHFXULWLVDWLRQ¶WKDWVFKRODUVKDYH
highlighted (Buzan et al., 1998). They have demonstrated how, E\VLPSO\HYRNLQJµVHFXULW\¶, 
VRPHWKLQJLVEHLQJGRQHDQGVRPHWKLQJGHPDQGVWREHGRQH$V: YHUQRWHVµ,W
LVE\ODEHOOLQJVRPHWKLQJDVHFXULW\LVVXHWKDWLWEHFRPHVRQH¶%\YRLFLQJsecurity, things 
that might ordinarily be politically untenable become not only thinkable but acceptable, 
including the introduction of extraordinary or exceptional new legislative powers or special 
measures. Security, thus viewed, is the result of a move that takes politics beyond the 
established rules of the game and frames the issue as above µQRUPDOSROLWLFV¶7KHLVVXHLV
then moved into the realm of emergency politics, where it can be dealt with swiftly and 
ZLWKRXWWKHQRUPDOGHPRFUDWLFSURFHGXUHV7KLVµVHFXULWLVDWLRQ¶RIVRFLDOOLIHFDQWKXVEH
thought of as a consequential condition in which issues and problems are depoliticized and 
alternative ways of framing and responding to problems of order are set aside or suspended.  
 
+HQFHVHFXULW\SUDFWLFHVDQGSURFHVVHVRIVHFXULWLVDWLRQHPEHGDWHPSRUDOUHJLVWHUWKDWVHHNV
DIDVWHURUFRPSUHVVHGWLPHKRUL]RQ,QVHHNLQJWRFRPSUHVVWKHµQRUPDO¶URXWLQHVWKLVXUJHQW
µQRZ¶GLPHQVLRQRIVHFXULW\KDVGLVWLQFWWHPSRUDOLPSOLFDWLRQV+X\VPDQV
REVHUYHVKRZVHFXULWLVDWLRQLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHVµVSHHGLQJXS¶DJDLQVWWKHUHODWLYHVORZQHVVRI
QRUPDOSROLWLFVµ&DOOVIRUVSHHGQRWRQO\TXHVWLRQWKHYLDELOLW\RIGHOLEHUDWLRQDQGDFRQWHVW
RIRSLQLRQWKH\DOVRVXSSRUWVWUHQJWKHQLQJH[HFXWLYH-FHQWUHGJRYHUQPHQWDQGVXSSUHVV
GLVVHQW¶6HFXULW\LPSDUWVXUJHQF\LPSHQGLQJFRQVHTXHQFHVDQGWKHHYDVLRQRIHUVWZKLOH
SURFHVVHVµ5DWKHUWKDQGHEDWHDQGGHOLEHUDWLRQVHFXULWLVDWLRQFDOOVIRUVLOHQFHDQGVSHHG¶
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5RH, emphasis in original&RQVHTXHQWO\IRUPDQ\FRPPHQWDWRUVWKH
implications and outcomes of securitisation have almost exclusively been interpreted in a 
negative light as undermining democracy, destabilising political values, circumventing legal 
principles and eroding social relations; aVLQHYLWDEO\EDG,WXVKHUVSUREOHPDWLFHWKLFDO
FRQFHUQVVWLIOLQJGHEDWHDQGVLGH-OLQLQJFRXQWHU-YHLOLQJLQWHUHVWVThus understood, 
VHFXULWLVDWLRQUHSUHVHQWVIDLOXUHIDLOXUHWRDGGUHVVWKHLVVXHZLWKLQµQRUPDOERXQGV¶%X]DQet 
al., 7KHFRQWUDVWLQJDPELWLRQWKHUHIRUHLVµGHVHFXULWLVDWLRQ¶: YHU, 1995). <HW
OHVVUHJDUGKDVEHHQJLYHQWRKRZVHFXULW\±DVDVRFLDOJRRG±FDQEHSURGXFWLYHDQGLV
SURGXFHGE\ZKRPDQGLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKZKDWYDOXHV)OR\GKRZHYHUKDVXVHIXOO\
VRXJKWWRHODERUDWHDµMXVWWKHRU\RIVHFXULWLVDWLRQ¶JRYHUQHGE\FHUWDLQQRUPDWLYHSULQFLSOHV
ZKHUHE\µ,IIRULQVWDQFHZHYDOXHWKHUHGXFWLRQRIKXPDQZUHWFKHGQHVVLQWKHZRUOGDERYH
DOOHOVHWKHQWKHVXVSHQVLRQRIRUGLQDU\SROLWLFVLVPRUDOO\SHUPLVVLEOHSURYLGHGWKDWKXPDQ
EHLQJVDUHWKHEHQHILFLDULHVRIVHFXULW\SROLFLHVDQGQRWSRZHUKROGHUVDQGHOLWHV¶)OR\G
2QHPLJKWZLVKWRH[SDQGWKLVWRLQFRUSRUDWHQRQ-KXPDQVWKHHFR-V\VWHPDQG
IXWXUHJHQHUDWLRQV 
 
Security and sustainability3 
Like security, sustainability expresses temporality but does so in a distinctly different 
register, by referencing the long-term. Sustainability is characterised in terms of meeting 
short-WHUPQHHGVZLWKRXWFRPSURPLVLQJIXWXUHJHQHUDWLRQV¶FDSDFLW\WRPHHW their own needs 
(World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). Sustainable security 
practices, therefore, can be defined as those that meet the needs of the present without 
compromising the well-being of the future through adverse societal impacts, depletion of 
other fundamental social values - such as trust and legitimacy - or erosion to principles of 
freedom, due process or equity of treatment. Sustainable security requires attention to the 
causal, temporal and spatial structures and future implications of practices and technologies 
in the present. For instance, the existence of excessive security differentials and uneven 
distribution of safety have the capacity to exacerbate and compound extant inequalities. So 
too, they can foster inter-group or inter-personal tensions and social conflicts. Thus, spatial 
and social inequalities in security can generate vicious circles and malign feedback loops 
across time.  
 
                                                             
3
 This section develops upon ideas first published elsewhere (Crawford, 2014b). 
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A conception of sustainable security seeks precisely to reconcile short-term security needs 
that enable people to adapt and live confidently with threat and risk, with longer-term goals 
of developing a functioning, legitimate and normatively viable security system. It follows that 
the sustainability of security practices as public goods necessitates not only the construction 
of a just society in the present, but also the design of arrangements and procedures that secure 
lasting and continuing social and environmental justice in the future. This involves not only 
being attentive to the capacity of security measures to impact disproportionately on specific 
groups or unduly discriminate against them, but to be reflexive in terms of the constantly 
changing social, environmental, economic, political and legal climate in which security is 
enacted. Such an endeavour necessitates consideration of the role of justice principles and the 
rule of law as vital stepping stones along the pathway to legitimate and sustainable forms and 
levels of security. This underscores the requirement to manage uncertainty without prompting 
social injustices and amplified inequalities or compromising future security by generating 
new sources of insecurities.  
 
The recognition that we, humans, are making future environments (as geological agents) and 
thus literally shaping the future through our everyday activities has profound ethical 
implications. &DOOLFRWWDUJXHVWKDWWKHVSDWLDODQGHVSHFLDOO\WKHWHPSRUDOVFDOHVRI
JOREDOFOLPDWHFKDQJHGHPDQGERWKDVKLIWLQPRUDOSKLORVRSK\IURPDK\SHU-LQGLYLGXDOLVWLF
RQWRORJ\WRDWKRURXJKO\KROLVWLFRQWRORJ\DVZHOODVDVKLIWIURPDUHDVRQ-EDVHGWRD
VHQWLPHQW-EDVHGPRUDOSV\FKRORJ\,UHWXUQWRWKHUROHRIHPRWLRQVDQGDIIHFWLQ
XQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGDGYDQFLQJVHFXULW\SUDFWLFHVEHORZVHH&UDZIRUGDQG+XWFKLQVRQ
EEXWILUVW,IRFXVRQWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUFRQFHSWLRQVRIHWKLFVDQGMXVWLFH8VHIXOO\
'DOH-DPLHVRQGHSOR\VDQDOOHJRU\RIµ-DFNDQG-LOO¶KLJKOLJKWLQJVL[SRVVLEOH
VFHQDULRVVHH%R[EHORZWRLOOXVWUDWHDQGH[SORUHWKHGLIIHUHQWIRUPVRIPRUDO
UHVSRQVLELOLW\DQGFKDLQVRIFDXVDWLRQWKDWWKH$QWKURSRFHQHSURPSWVXVWRFRQVLGHU 
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The moral evaluation of the wrongfulness of Ditty 1 is clear and parallels the stuff of much 
criminal justice processing in contemporary societies. The link between Jack and Jill is direct, 
both in time and space, and the intentionality is clear. Intuitively, we acknowledge the 
wrongfulness. However, the moral issues, intentionality, chains of causation, and 
spatial/temporal relationships become less clear as we move through the subsequent ditties. 
In Ditty 2, the agent who harms Jill is an unstructured collective rather than an individual, 
whereas, in Ditty 3, the amount of harm that Jack causes to Jill is reduced to a minimum. In 
'LWW\WKHVSDWLDOSUR[LPLW\EHWZHHQ-DFNDQG-LOOLVGLVORFDWHGDQG-DFN¶VLQWHQWLRQVDUHQR
ORQJHUPDOLJQ,Q'LWW\QRWRQO\DUH-DFN¶VEDGLQWHQWLRQVUHPRYHGEXWDOVRDWHPSRUDO
remoteness between Jack and Jill is introduced. Finally, Ditty 6 combines all of the changes 
that are included in Ditties 2-5. Subsequently, it is harder to identify the agents, the victims 
and the causal relationship. In essence, it appears less evident that anyone has intentionally 
deprived future people who will live in another part of the world from ever having bicycles. 
Consequently, -DPLHVRQ¶VILQDO'LWW\LVHYLGHQWO\DQDOOHJRU\DERXWFOLPDWHFKDQJH,WLV
YDOXDEOHIRURXUSXUSRVHVDVLWKLJKOLJKWVWKHPRUDODQGSROLWLFDOFKDOOHQJHVRIVHFXULW\
SUDFWLFHVDFURVVWLPHZKHQYLHZHGWKURXJKVXFKDZLGHUWHPSRUDODQGVSDWLDOOHQV
)XUWKHUPRUHVRPHRIWKHIHDWXUHVRIFOLPDWHFKDQJHDOVRDWWHQGWRVHFXULW\-UHODWHGKDUPV
QRWDEO\WKHDPSOLI\LQJSRZHURIWHFKQRORJLHVDQGWKHVWUHWFKLQJ-RUµGLVHPEHGGLQJ¶-RIWLPH
DQGVSDFH7KXVLIZHUHSODFHµ-LOO¶VELNH¶ZLWKµ-LOO¶VVDIHW\DQGVHFXULW\¶DQGWKHFKDLQRI
%R['DOH-DPLHVRQ¶V6L['LWWLHV 
'LWW\-DFNLQWHQWLRQDOO\VWHDOV-LOO¶VELF\FOH2QHLQGLYLGXDODFWLQJ
LQWHQWLRQDOO\KDVKDUPHGDQRWKHULQGLYLGXDOWKHLQGLYLGXDOVDQGWKHKDUPDUH
FOHDUO\LGHQWLILDEOHDQGWKH\DUHFORVHO\UHODWHGLQWLPHDQGVSDFH 
'LWW\-DFNLVSDUWRIDQXQDFTXDLQWHGJURXSRIVWUDQJHUVHDFKRIZKRP
DFWLQJLQGHSHQGHQWO\WDNHVRQHSDUWRI-LOO¶VELNHUHVXOWLQJLQWKHELNH¶V
GLVDSSHDUDQFH 
'LWW\-DFNWDNHVRQHSDUWIURPHDFKRIDODUJHQXPEHURIELNHVRQHRI
ZKLFKEHORQJVWR-LOO 
'LWW\-DFNDQG-LOOOLYHRQGLIIHUHQWFRQWLQHQWVDQGWKHORVVRI-LOO¶VELNHLV
WKHFRQVHTXHQFHRIDFDXVDOFKDLQWKDWEHJLQVZLWK-DFNRUGHULQJDXVHGELNH
DWDVKRS 
'LWW\-DFNOLYHVPDQ\FHQWXULHVEHIRUH-LOODQGFRQVXPHVPDWHULDOVWKDWDUH
HVVHQWLDOWRELNHPDQXIDFWXULQJDVDUHVXOWLWZLOOQRWEHSRVVLEOHIRU-LOOWR
KDYHDELF\FOH 
'LWW\$FWLQJLQGHSHQGHQWO\-DFNDQGDODUJHQXPEHURIXQDFTXDLQWHG
SHRSOHVHWLQPRWLRQDFKDLQRIHYHQWVWKDWFDXVHVDODUJHQXPEHURIIXWXUH
SHRSOHZKRZLOOOLYHLQDQRWKHUSDUWRIWKHZRUOGIURPHYHUKDYLQJELNHV 
 
$GDSWHGIURP-DPLHVRQ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HYHQWVEHFRPHDVIROORZVµVHFXULW\SUDFWLFHVRIVRPHZKLFKLPSDFWQHJDWLYHO\RQRWKHUV
HLWKHULQWKHPRPHQWRUODWHULQWLPH¶ZHFDQVHHWKHWHPSRUDOSDUDOOHOVZLWKTXHVWLRQVRI
µVHFXULW\¶DQGHWKLFDOFRQFHSWLRQVRIMXVWLFHHPEHGGHGWKHUHLQ 
 
-DPLHVRQOLQNVWKLVHWKLFGLUHFWO\WRZKDWKHUHIHUVWRDVµFOLPDWHMXVWLFH¶6XFKD
QRWLRQSURPSWVDUHWKLQNLQJRIFDXVDWLRQDQGUHVSRQVLELOLW\LQWKHFRQWH[WRIMXVWLFHIDU
EH\RQGWKHWUDGLWLRQDOO\narrow time frameDQGLQWHQWLRQDOLW\RIWKHsubstantiveFULPLQDOODZ
±ZKLFK embodies distinct ideological assumption about causation and free will that delimit a 
wider vista regarding past and future causes and consequences (Kelman, 1981). Yet, 
-DPLHVRQ¶VVFHQDULRVGUDZDWWHQWLRQWRWKHZD\VLQZKLFKPRUDOLW\DQGWLPHVWDQd in an 
awkward relation to one another. Whilst it may seem obvious that, as individuals, we are 
morally responsible for what we did and also for what we will do, particularly vexing 
complications are thrown up in relation to cross-generational justice. Some of these have 
been illustrated, for example, by the extent to which moral responsibility reaches into the past 
for the historic inequalities of wealth and power to which it is contributing in the present. In a 
different context, Hall and colleagues (2014) have exposed these complexities with regard to 
the legacies of slavery derived from compensation payments made to slave owners following 
the abolition of slavery. 4 Their work begs the question: given the scale of the injustices 
committed and despite the length of time passed, do those alive today who benefited from 
compensation payments, owe something ± by way of reparation - to the contemporary 
descendants of those who suffered as a result of slavery?7KLVUHIUDPLQJRIMXVWLFHSUHILJXUHV
DPRUHIXQGDPHQWDOVKLIWLQRXUFRQFHSWLRQRIMXVWLFHLQWKH$QWKURSRFHQHWRLQFOXGHµMXVWLFH
EHWZHHQJHQHUDWLRQVEHWZHHQVPDOOLVODQG-QDWLRQVDQGWKHSROOXWLQJFRXQWULHVERWKSDVWDQG
SURVSHFWLYHEHWZHHQGHYHORSHGLQGXVWULDOLVHGQDWLRQVKLVWRULFDOO\UHVSRQVLEOHIRUPRVW
HPLVVLRQVDQGWKHQHZO\LQGXVWULDOLVLQJRQHVDQGVRRQ¶&KDNUDEDUW\ 
 
*HQHUDOO\Flimate change ± in terms of climate variability and extreme events - can be seen 
as an injustice that rich countries (and rich people in poor countries) inflict on poor countries 
(and the poor people in poor countries). Historically, the emissions that have caused climate 
                                                             
4
 They have identified and traced the histories of the 3,000 or so British-based slave owners who received 
almost half of the £20 million compensation following the Abolition of Slavery Act 1833 (see the Legacies of 
British Slave Ownership website at: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/). Their research shows how the compensation 
money directly benefited industry, the development of merchant banks and marine insurance as well as families, 
who amassed art collections and built country houses. Although many of the families named in the Slave 
Compensation Commission ± on which the research is based ± have died out, nonetheless, some have survived 
to produce famous descendants. 
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change have derived from rich countries, while much of the suffering related to climate 
change is likely to occur in poor countries and impact adversely upon the poorest members in 
those countries. In addition to contributing less to climate change, poorer countries are also 
more vulnerable to its impacts.These vulnerable peoples have less resources or capacity, 
both technological and financial, to respond. :KLOHWKHJHQHUDWRUVRIFOLPDWHFKDQJHKDYH
KLVWRULFDOO\EHHQWKHDIIOXHQWZRUOGDQGWKHLUDIIOXHQFHPD\HQDEOHWKHPWRFRFRRQ
WKHPVHOYHVWRDFHUWDLQGHJUHHIURPVRPHRIWKHLPSDFWRIJOREDOZDUPLQJDQGFOLPDWH
LQVWDELOLW\QRQHWKHOHVVWKHFOLPDWHKDVDOHYHOOLQJDQGXQLYHUVDOLVLQJHIIHFW±DOOKXPDQVDQG
DOOQRQ-KXPDQVZLOOEHDIIHFWHGE\FOLPDWHFKDQJH<HWJLYHQWKHLQYHQWLYHQHVVDQG
UHIOH[LYLW\RIKXPDQVDQGWKHPDUNHWLQFHQWLYHVWRLQQRYDWH0F$IHHLVQRGRXEW
FRUUHFWLQVSHFXODWLQJWKDWµWKHJXOIZLOOGHHSHQEHWZHHQWKHFOLPDWH-SURWHFWHGDQGWKHIDU
JUHDWHUQXPEHURISHRSOHZKRVHDOUHDG\-SUHFDULRXVOLYHVDUHWKUHDWHQHGE\WKHFRQVHTXHQFHV
RIFOLPDWHFKDQJH«WKHULFKPD\IDFHWKHVDPHVWRUPVEXWWKH\GRKDYHOLIHERDWV¶ 
 
&RQVHTXHQWO\VHFXULW\GLIIHUHQWLDOVDUHSHUYDVLYHO\WLHGWRJOREDOVRFLDOLQHTXDOLWLHVDQGWKH
FDSDFLW\WRFRFRRQRQHVHOIIURPQRQ-FOLPDWH-UHODWHGLQVHFXULWLHVLVFRQVLGHUDEOH+HQFH
WKHUHDUHFHUWDLQGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQµFOLPDWHMXVWLFH¶DQGWKHDQDORJRXVLGHDRIµVHFXULW\
MXVWLFH¶- the confluence of two tensely related concepts (Gearty, 2013; Crawford, 2014b) It 
foregrounds equity of access to key goods and services as a prerequisite of sustainable 
communities, both as a good in itself and in that inequities breed insecurities. From a 
normative and ethical standpoint, security should not be treated as a good simply to be 
maximised, but rather as something to be achieved as far as possible at an equal level for all; 
WRPLQLPLVHLQHTXLWLHVRIGLVWULEXWLRQ7KHQRWLRQRIµVXVWDLQDEOHVHFXULW\¶ thereby infers 
ideas of distributive justice across space, time and generations. It foregrounds the temporal 
DQGVSDWLDOXQHYHQQHVVRIVHFXULW\SUDFWLFHVDQGWKHLUGLIIHUHQWLDOLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUSHRSOHV¶
liberties and freedoms, as well as experiences of (in)justice both in the present and in the 
future. As such, it underscores equity between generations, in that future generations should 
not be materially disadvantaged by the activities of the current generation.  
 
Security and the µeveryday¶ 
:KHUHDVµVHFXULW\¶WHQGVWRIRFXVRQWKHVSHFWDFXODUWKDWGLVUXSWVWKHQRUPDOWKHQRWLRQRIWKH
µHYHU\GD\¶UHFRJQLVHVWKHVKDUHGUHDOLW\RIWKHPXQGDQHµ(YHU\GD\OLIH«QRWRQO\
GHVFULEH>V@WKHOLYHVRIRUGLQDU\SHRSOHEXWUHFRJQLVHVWKDWHYHU\OLIHFRQWDLQVDQHOHPHQWRI
WKHRUGLQDU\¶)HOVNL7KHHYHU\GD\KLJKOLJKWVWKHURXWLQHUHJXODULVHGDQG
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SUHYDLOLQJQDWXUHRILQVHFXULW\QRWDEO\IRUVRPHSHRSOHOLYLQJLQSDUWLFXODUHQYLURQPHQWV
5HFHQWO\6WHYHQ+XWFKLQVRQDQG,KDYHVRXJKWWRKLJKOLJKWLQVLJKWVSURYLGHGE\H[SORULQJ
VHFXULW\WKURXJKWKHOHQVRIWKHHYHU\GD\&UDZIRUGDQG+XWFKLQVRQE)URPRXU
SHUVSHFWLYHWKHFRQFHSWRIµHYHU\GD\VHFXULW\¶KDVWZREURDGDQGLQWHUUHODWHGGLPHQVLRQV
7KHILUVWFRPSULVHVWKHOLYHGH[SHULHQFHVRILQGLYLGXDOVDQGJURXSVZKRLQWHUDFWZLWK
JRYHUQPHQWDOVHFXULW\SURJUDPPHVDQGSUDFWLFHV,WLQFOXGHVWKHPDQQHULQZKLFKVHFXULW\
SURMHFWVDUHLQWHUSUHWHGIHOWUHFHLYHGDGDSWHGDQGUHVLVWHGE\GLIIHUHQWSHRSOHDVZHOODVWKHLU
RZQSHUFHSWLRQVDQGXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIVXFKPHDVXUHV7KHVHFRQGIHDWXUHKLJKOLJKWV 
the more mundane and quotidian practices and habits that are understood or 
FKDUDFWHUL]HGE\SHRSOHDQGJURXSVDVEHLQJ³DERXWVHFXULW\´DQGZKLFKDUHFUDIWHG
and carried out on a regular (everyday) basis, namely the production of ³VHFXULW\IURP
EHORZ´&UDZIRUGDQG+XWFKLQVRQE 
 
+HQFHµHYHU\GD\VHFXULW\¶KDVDQLQIRUPDODQGWDNHQ-IRU-JUDQWHGTXDOLW\<HW, experiences of 
formal security practices and quotidian security practices are interconnected in important 
ways: µ)RUPDOVHFXULW\SURMHFWV«ZLOODOZD\VEHHPEHGGHGZLWKLQDQGLQWXUQDWOHDVWLQ
SDUWFRQVWLWXWHGE\WDFLWIRUPVRILQIRUPDOORFDORUGHUVRFLDOLQHTXDOLWLHVURXWLQHKDELWVDQG
SURFHGXUHVDQGWKHPXQGDQHSUDFWLFHVDQGKDELWVRIRUGLQDU\SHRSOH¶&UDZIRUGDQG
+XWFKLQVRQE (PSKDVLVLQJWKHµHYHU\GD\¶ provides nuanced understandings of 
security, which demands more attention be given to how the less prominent and less powerful 
± in both institutional and non-institutional settings ± interact with formal, state-initiated 
µVHFXULW\¶LQYDULRXVZD\V 
 
More generally, the everyday acts as an important counterfoil to a prevailing emphasis upon 
the spectacular and exceptionally dramatic events, which frequently cast a long shadow over 
security research (and indeed criminology more broadly). It serves as a counterfoil to, what 
du Gay (2003) calls, WKHµW\UDQQ\RIWKHHSRFKDO¶WKDWSHUYDGHVWKHVRFLDOVFLHQFHVZKLFK
reflects a preoccupation with radical discontinuity, disruption and transformation at the 
expense of persistence, micro-change and accumulation in the everydayness of historical 
FKDQJH7RRRIWHQVXFKµHSRFKDOLVP¶PDNHVµFKDQJHDSSHDUWKHLQHYLWDEOHRXWFRPHRI
abstract non-ORFDWDEOHLPSXOVHVDQGLPSHUDWLYHV«UDWKHUWKDQWKHUHVXOWRIVSHFLIic (and 
WUDFHDEOHSROLWLFDOFKRLFHV¶WKDWEXLOGXSRQHDFKRWKHULQLQFUHPHQWDOZD\V
Historic ruptures are often inscribed into particular spectacular events or moments, most 
notably and symbolically 9/11 in the context of security studies.  
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7KHHWKLFVRIWKHHYHU\GD\DUHDOVRGLIIHUHQWWRWKRVHRIWKHLPPHGLDWHWKHµHPHUJHQW¶DQGWKH
ORQJ-WHUP6WXGLHVRIWKHHYHU\GD\UHQGHUPXQGDQHDQGURXWLQHWKHOLYHGH[SHULHQFHVRI
LQVHFXULW\YXOQHUDELOLW\DQGYLFWLPLVDWLRQJLYLQJDWWHQWLRQDQGDFFRUGLQJSULRULW\WRLWV
µHYHU\GD\QHVV¶Whereas critical security studies have largely ignored the role of 
interpersonal feelings, emotions and affect as well as the meanings that people attribute to 
events and experiences, by contrast, the everyday accords space for consideration of the 
HPRWLRQDOILHOGDQGEULQJVWRWKHIRUHWKHUROHRIµHPRWLRQZRUN¶+RFKVFKLOG, 1979). 
Emotions do not exist independent of everyday life, but are shaped through direct experience 
of practical activities and engagement with the social world. Hence, research on security that 
is focused upon the everyday must come to terms with, and work through the implications of, 
the manifest centrality of emotions to security processes. ,PSRUWDQWO\UHFRJQLWLRQRIWKHVH
GLPHQVLRQVWRWKHHYHU\GD\SURYLGHVDQLQYLWDWLRQWRLQYHVWLJDWHWKHOLQNVDQGDQWDJRQLVPV
EHWZHHQµSROLWLFV¶DQGHYHU\GD\OLIHH[SHULHQFHVDQGSUDFWLFHV$VIHPLQLVWVKDYHVKRZQLWLV
LQWKHSROLWLFVRIHYHU\GD\OLIHWKDWSRZHUG\QDPLFVDQGSDWULDUFKDOQRUPVDUHIRUJHGDQG
UHSURGXFHGRIWHQLPSHUFHSWLEO\DQGSHUYDVLYHO\RYHUWLPH,WWKHUHE\IRFXVHVRQWKHLQIRUPDO
DQGWKHUHODWLRQDOQDWXUHRIVHFXULW\±ZKDW6WULW]HOFDOOVµUHDOZRUOG¶VHFXULWLVDWLRQV
Everyday security identifies people living with and coping with insecurity (wherever that 
may be) as not only vulnerable but also as having creative capacities for organisation, 
resilience and problem-solving in ways that provide novel insights into practices and 
processes of securing.  
 
Problematically, however, the everyday also incorporates a tendency to normalcy. Because it 
is managed and lived day-to-dayLWEHFRPHVµQRUPDO¶DQGWROHUDWHGRIWHQWKURXJKSURFHVVHV
of acculturation. Moreover, as Corfield observes, µWKHURXWLQHVRIGDLO\OLYLQJEOXUWKHKLVWRULF
ZHLJKWRILQGLYLGXDODFWLRQVDQGGHFLVLRQVPRPHQWE\PRPHQW¶(2007: 246). In so doing, the 
everyday is always in danger of accepting (as given) wider structural conditions and 
constraints. It can run the risk of treating macro-social inequalities as inevitable. Thus, the 
everyday can be viewed as conservatively rooted in tradition, whereby the horizon of 
possibilities are narrowed and new threats or sources of danger are ignored. It tends to 
constrict the focus onto the momentary event, liable to fleeting interventions, rather than in 
terms of intractable problems that require long-term solutions.  
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Hence, for these everyday LQVWDQFHVRIµPLFUR-SROLWLFV¶to be more than short-term projects in 
making do and coping with inequities of the status quo, they need to interconnect with larger 
agendas for political change. As feminists have shown, it is in the politics of everyday life 
that power dynamics and patriarchal norms are forged and reproduced, often imperceptibly 
and pervasively over time (Stanko, 1995). The challenge is to move from the micro-level 
experiences to the wider macro and structural material inequalities, injustices, abuses of 
power that might constitute the foundations of broader strategies of empowerment. In this 
sense, everyday security constitutes a form of what James C. Scott (1990: 200) termed 
µLQIUDSROLWLFV¶, which informs the formal world of political discourses but does so in a way 
that is often hidden, denied or left unacknowledged. Infrapolitics is performed, acted out and 
recreated in sites far removed from governmental authorities and those wielding formal 
power. Consequently, the infrapolitical is something that is often invisible in official politics 
but which is its infrastructural level, providing elementary forms of political life. 
$FFRUGLQJO\µLQIUDSROLWLFVPD\EHWKRXJKWRIDV«WKHEXLOGLQJEORFNIRUWKHPRUHHODERUDWH 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]HGSROLWLFDODFWLRQWKDWFRXOGQRWH[LVWZLWKRXWLW¶6FRWW, 1990: 201). 
Importantly, its recognition provides an invitation to investigate the links and antagonisms 
between politics and everyday life experiences and practices. Despite the association of 
everydayness with continuity, it need not be conservatively rooted in tradition, but rather can 
EHIOXLGDPELYDOHQWDQGRSHQWRQHZSRVVLELOLWLHV)RUDV+DUULVRQFRQWHQGVµLQWKH
everyday enactment of the world there is always immanent potential for new possibilities of 
OLIH¶Nonetheless, the difficulties of scaling up from the human, small-scale of 
temporal, spatial and conceptual immediacy and affective authenticity of the everyday ± what 
Srnicek and Williams (2016: 9-13) dHULGHDVµIRONSROLWLFV¶± to strategic, systematic and 
long-term thinking and actions remain evidently challenging ones. From such a perspective, it 
may become clear that politics and security are intertwined, not opposed, such that studies of 
everyday security can serve as useful critical vantage-points from which to expose 
inequalities and differences, and to re-engage politics rather than prompt de-politicisation.  
 
Security and WKHµePHUJHQW¶ 
Just as we have EHFRPHFRQFHUQHGDERXWWKHµORQJ-WHUP¶IXWXUH, questions of sustainability, 
and the impact of the present on generations to come, countervailing trends have 
simultaneously engendered a prioritisation of a much more immediate and immanent time 
KRUL]RQQDPHO\WKHµHPHUJHQW¶ or the µconstant present¶. Digital culture and developments in 
communication and information technologies have heralded extensive debates about the 
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speeding up of time and the acceleration of life in digital capitalism. Urry (2000), for 
H[DPSOHDUJXHVWKDWQHZWHFKQRORJLHVJHQHUDWHQHZIRUPVRIµLQVWDQWDQHRXVWLPH¶
characterised by uncertainty, unpredictable change and quantum simultaneity, all of which 
highlight the significance of exceptionally short-term and fragmented time. Others, like 
Wajcman, argue that there is µno temporal logic inherent in digital technologies¶
5DWKHUWKHµFRQWHPSRUDU\LPSHUDWLYHRIVSHHGLVDVPXFKDFXOWXUDODUWHIDFWDVDPDWHULDO
RQH«built into our devices by all-too-KXPDQVFKHPHVDQGGHVLUHV¶Wajcman, 2015: 183, 3). 
Nonetheless, µHPHUJHQWWLPH¶DQGWKHFXOWXUDODOOXUHRIVSHHGKDYHEHFRPHsalient 
experiences of shifting contemporary relationships to time that are informed by the 
emergence of digitisation and, in turn, inform the rhythms of everyday life. 
 
,QWKHµ3HWDE\WH$JH¶RIµ%LJ'DWD¶DQDO\WLFVthe volume, variety and velocity of new forms 
of data enable interventions in the present that shape the future in diverse (and as yet 
unimaginable) ways. Moreover, these have evident implications for security. Not only does 
WKLVµUHYROXWLRQLQGDWD¶SURYLGHQHZVRXUFHVRINQRZOHGJHVWLmulate new approaches to its 
generation, analysis and visualisation, and prompt new questions for research, but also, 
DFFRUGLQJWRVRPHWKHµGDWDGHOXJH¶DQGFRPSXWDWLRQDOFDSDELOLWLHVµPDNHVWKHVFLHQWLILF
method obsoletH¶$QGHUVRQ, 2008). Whilst this is undoubtedly an exaggeration, the rise of 
Big Data does present a challenge to scientific practice and the erstwhile search for causality 
(Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013). It questions established epistemological assumptions 
and possibly reconfigures how research is conducted (Kitchin, 2014), including criminology 
(Chan and Bennett Moses, 2016)$NH\GLPHQVLRQRIµ%LJ'DWD¶WKDWFKDOOHQJHVWUDGLWLRQDO
conceptions resides less in its volume or variety, and more in its velocity; the speed at which 
data are being added or processed, through computational algorithms. Real-time data enable 
the generation of knowledge and its application in compressed time-horizons and prompts a 
perspective of emergent causality. It elicits a reflexive approach to knowledge creation and 
application as both relational and as a state of being, with feedback loops and changes 
through iterative processes (Chandler, 2015).  
 
In different but analogous ways to the Anthropocene, the µdata revolution¶ also serves to blur 
distinctions between human and non-human, between subject and object (Thrift, 2014). 
&KDQGOHUQRWHVµ%LJ'DWDLVWKHUHE\UHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIRWKHUVKLIWVERWKLQVRFLDOWKHRU\DQGLQ
computational analysis, which tend to focus on the enrichment of smaller or micro-level 
descriptive analysis rather than macro-level theory-EXLOGLQJ¶Datafication 
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UHPRYHVWKHQHHGIRUµFDXVDOWKHRU\DQGIRUWRS-down forms of governance on the basis of 
cause-and-HIIHFW¶ (Chandler, 2015: 844). Knowledge has to be fine-grained and real-time 
rather than abstract or universal - causal lines of prediction and implementation become less 
relevant. It does not LPSO\PRYHPHQWµXS¶WRPDFUR-theories and general laws; rather data 
PLQLQJGULOOVµGRZQ¶WRFRQWH[WXDOLVDWLRQDQGWKHVSHFLILFLW\RILQGLYLGXDOFDVHVEmergent 
causality derived from real-time interactions and connections constitutes a much µflatter¶ or 
µKRUL]RQWDO¶UHDOLW\ (Latour, 2005: 165-72).  
 
Digital technologies and Big Data provide possible insights into shifting patterns of security 
and changing contexts, potentially enabling real-time reflexive awareness and management of 
risks, threats and problems as they arise. Most particularly, algorithms built into socio-
technical assemblages appear to afford far-reaching potential for security (Staniforth and 
Akhgar, 2015). Algorithms imply novel ways of knowing, even though their actual 
operations and software content are all-too-frequently inaccessible and invisible. They 
exemplify the complex interplay and co-constitution of human and non-human machine-
based elements of technology. They presage IRUPVRIµDOJRULWKPLFMXVWLFH¶ZKHUHWKH
preventive designs are built into the algorithms that determine how information is used. As 
Amazon and Google seek to predict your taste, so too the algorithms of future services, 
providers and utilities seek to prevent or design out µEDGULVNV¶+DUFRXUW, 2015). Algorithms 
come to replace expert knowledge and processes of interpretation, however, they are not 
impartial as they embed different philosophies and assumptions. In so doing, they push the 
boundaries of cognition decision-making, agency and responsibility beyond humans, polities 
and the nation-state. The deployment of algorithmic techniques and technologies for security 
has both political and ethical implications. With this in mind, $PRRUHDQG5DOH\
appositely SRVHWKHTXHVWLRQµ$PLGWKHDSSDUHQWSUROLIHUDWLRQRIDOJRULWKPLFWHFKQLTXHVLQ
the gathering of intelligence data from battlefield, border and city streets, what are the 
political and ethical stakes involved in securing with, through and via algorithms in the 21st 
FHQWXU\"¶ 
 
More generally, this points to an appreciation of contingency, rather than quests for a 
UHWULHYDORIµFHUWDLQW\¶DVZHOODVWKHOLPLWVWRLQVWUXPHQWDOFDXVH-and-effect approaches to 
governing not only crime but also medicine, healthcare and other public services. Awareness 
of the possibilities and diversifying implications of Big Data, as well as its dangers and 
limitations, constitutes a major challenge for the social sciences; its epistemologies, 
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methodologies and knowledge assumptions and application looking forward. It also raises 
ethical questions about ownership and use of these data, which are produced by ordinary 
people in everyday interactions. Big Data might be argued to have diversifying and levelling 
effects. 1RQHWKHOHVVDEOLQNHUHGIRFXVRQWKHµHPHUJHQW¶OHDYHVOLWWOHVSDFHIor linkages to be 
made to long-term and enduring structural dynamics and inequalities or the politics and 
resources required to address these. Instead, we are left simply with fleeting and momentary 
interventions that leave the inequitable status quo intact whilst remaining inattentive to its 
future after-effects. 
 
Conclusion 
µ7LPHLVD³FRPLQJ´WKHPH¶DV&RUILHOGQRWHVµORRNLQJDWWKHZRUOGQRWRQO\³LQWKHURXQG´
EXWDOVR³LQWKHORQJ´¶7KLVLVHVSHFLDOO\VRLQDQDQWKURSRJHQLFDJHLQZKLFK
KXPDQVKDYHEHFRPHDGULYLQJIRUFHRIHFRORJLFDOFKDQJH7KH$QWKURSRFHQHUHTXLUHVXVWR
WKLQNGLIIHUHQWO\QRWRQO\DERXWRXUSODFHDVKXPDQVRQWKLVSODQHWEXWDOVRKRZZH
XQGHUVWDQGWKHLQWHUFRQQHFWLRQVEHWZHHQWKHSDVWSUHVHQWDQGIXWXUHDFURVVGLYHUVHILHOGVRI
VRFLDODFWLYLW\$V&KDEUDEDUW\VXJJHVWVLWQHFHVVLWDWHVµ]RRPLQJLQ¶DQG
µ]RRPLQJRXW¶GLIIHUHQWWHPSRUDOLWLHVDQGVKXWWOLQJEHWZHHQµGLIIHUHQWVFDOHVSHUVSHFWLYHVDQG
GLIIHUHQWOHYHOVRIDEVWUDFWLRQ¶&RQFHSWXDOO\SUDFWLFDOO\DQGLQLWVHIIHFWVVHFXULW\KDV
PXOWLSOHWHPSRUDOLWLHVWKDWLQWHUDFWLQDFRPSOH[DQGLQWHUZRYHQODWWLFH$V,KDYHWULHGWR
VKRZWKH$QWKURSRFHQHKDVFOHDULPSOLFDWLRQVIRURXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIFDXVDWLRQPRUDO
UHVSRQVLELOLW\DQGMXVWLFHDVZHOODVKRZZHWKLQNDERXWVHFXULW\SUDFWLFHVWKHLUJHQHVLV
SDWWHUQVRIGHYHORSPHQWDGDSWDWLRQVDQGLPSOLFDWLRQV,QWKHSUHFHGLQJGLVFXVVLRQV,KDYH
VLPSO\VRXJKWWRGUDZWRJHWKHUDQGVNHWFKRXWVRPHRIWKHFRQFHSWXDOFRQWRXUVWKDWPLJKW
LQIRUPDQGSURPSWDUHWKLQNLQJRIVHFXULW\DVDEUDLGHGDVVHPEODJHRIWKHµHPHUJHQW¶
µHYHU\GD\¶DQGµORQJ-WHUP¶DORQJVLGHWKHDWWULEXWHVRISHUVLVWHQFHPLFUR-FKDQJHDQGUDGLFDO
GLVFRQWLQXLW\LQWKHVKDSHRIKLVWRU\,QDGGLWLRQWRWKHWHPSRUDOGLPHQVLRQWKH$QWKURSRFHQH
DOVRGHPDQGVWKDWZHDFFRUGGXHUHJDUGWRWKHLQWHUDFWLRQVEHWZHHQGLIIHUHQWGRPDLQV
V\VWHPVDQGQHWZRUNV±QRWDEO\WKHVRFLDOHFRORJLFDODQGWHFKQRORJ\-DQGDWGLIIHUHQW
VFDOHV<HWWKHVL]HRIWKHFKDOOHQJHWKHVFRSHRIDJHQF\WKHFDSDFLW\WRHIIHFWFKDQJHDQGWKH
UDGLFDOO\UHIUDPHGWKLQNLQJUHTXLUHGWRUHVSRQGFDQHDVLO\UHVXOWLQGHVSRQGHQF\
KHOSOHVVQHVVLQHUWLDDQGDVHQVHRIIXWLOLW\$V%UXQR/DWRXUKDVUHFHQWO\QRWHG 
people are not equipped with the mental and emotional repertoire to deal with such a 
vast scale of events; that they have difficulty submitting to such a rapid acceleration for 
which, in addition, they are supposed to feel responsible while, in the meantime, this 
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call for action has none of the traits of their older revolutionary dreams. How can we 
simultaneously be part of such a long history, have such an important influence, and yet 
be so late in realizing what has happened and so utterly impotent in our attempts to fix 
it? (2014: 1-2) 
 
Apocalyptic scenarios about the impact of climate change have a tendency to µdepoliticise¶ 
debate, constituting an arena in which a µpost-political¶ frame is fashioned, arranged and 
embedded Swyngedouw, 2011). According to Swyngedouw, much of the climate change 
and sustainability argumHQWLVµLQKHUHQWO\UHDFWLRQDU\¶IRUKLP in that it µKDV evacuated the 
politics of the possible, the radical contestation of alternative future socio-environmental 
possibilities and socio-natural arrangements, and has silenced the antagonisms and conflicts 
that are constitutive of our socio-natural orders by externalizing conflicW¶228). ,QWKH
IDFHRIVXFKIHDUV, there is an urgent need to UHWKLQNµWKHSROLWLFDO¶DQGWKHVFRSHIRUD
UHIRUPXODWHGHWKLFRIMXVWLFHWKHUHLQ sXFKWKDWDV/HYHQHVXJJHVWVFlimate 
FKDQJHPD\EHVHHQDVµWKHRFFDVLRQnot WKHFDXVHRIKXPDQLW\¶VXOWLPDWHPRUDODQGHWKLFDO
FKDOOHQJH¶)DUIURPWKHµGHDWKRISROLWLFV¶LWLVDQWLFLSDWHGWKDWWKLVmay help open up new 
possibilities for a different politics ± a more nuanced and engaged µLQIUDSROLWLFV¶RIVHFXULW\. 
 
There are parallels here with the framing of security that Chandler (2016) detects in and 
through new forms of mediation and agency in the field of digital policy activism being 
GHYHORSHGDQGDSSOLHGLQµWKH&LW\RIWKH$QWKURSRFHQH¶ in Jakarta, Indonesia. He concludes:  
Securing the Anthropocene cannot be done by attempts to socially or technologically 
engineer the world, but it can be done by applying technological applications to 
citizens recast as a geo-socially networked community of sensors, attuned to the 
³XQIROGLQJ´ of the Anthropocene as a human-non-human assemblage of open-ended 
interrelations. (2016: 12)  
 
Such networks and relationships preface a repurposing and re-envisioning of security 
practices attentive to the micro-SROLWLFVDQGµLQIUD-SROLWLFV¶RIWKHHPHUJHQWDQGWKHHYHU\GD\
as well as how these interconnect with and are enmeshed in the long-term. It should 
simultaneously prompt debates about alternative politics of time and our entanglement in the 
shifting and multiple temporalities of social, technological and geological life. 
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)LQDOO\WKHKLVWRU\RIWKH$QWKURSRFHQHWKXVIDUKDVEHHQRQHWKDWLQFOXGHVDPL[RI
SHUVLVWHQFHPLFUR-FKDQJHWKURXJKWKHDGGLWLYHDQGFXPXODWLYHHIIHFWVRIHYHU\GD\DFWLYLWLHV
DQGUDGLFDOGLVFRQWLQXLW\WLSSLQJSRLQWVWXUEXOHQFHDQGPDFUR-WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ5HFRJQLVLQJ
WKLVSURPSWVXVWRH[SORUHPXOWLGLPHQVLRQDOZD\VRILQWHUSUHWLQJWKHLQWHUZRYHQSDWWHUQRI
SHUVLVWHQFHDFFXPXODWLRQDQGWUDQVIRUPDWLRQWKDWZLOOQRGRXEWFRQWLQXHWRVKDSHWKHIXWXUH
WRR%XWKLVWRU\DOVRUHFRUGVKRZKXPDQVareUHIOHFWLYHDJHQWVFDSDEOHRIDGDSWDWLRQDQG
FKDQJH+XPDQVDUHQRW only notorious as µSUREOHP-creators¶EXWDOVR as µSUREOHP-solvers¶ 
+LVWRU\UHPLQGVXVWKDWHYHQPDMRUFKDQJHVDQGWXUEXOHQFHµZLOOEHPLWLJDWHGDQGFRXQWHU-
balanced by continuities and micro-changes, making the final outcome at once 
FRPSUHKHQVLEOHDIWHUWKHHYHQWEXWXQSUHGLFWDEOHEHIRUHLW¶&RUILHOG, 2011: 13). 
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